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Abstract
This article tests whether agricultural extension and imperfect su-
pervision conated here into the number of visits by a technical assis-
tant increase productivity in a sample of contract farming arrange-
ments between a processing rm and small agricultural producers in
Madagascar. Production functions are estimated which treat the num-
ber of visits by a technical assistant as an input and which exploit the
variation in the number of visits between the contracted crops grown
on a given plot by a specic grower, thereby accounting for district-
, grower-, and plot-level unobserved heterogeneity. Results indicate
that the elasticity of yield with respect to the number of visits lies
between 1.3 and 1.7.
JEL Classication Codes: L24, O13, O14, Q12.
Keywords: Supervision, Extension, Contract Farming, Grower-
Processor Contracts
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Introduction
How e¤ective are the processors investments in agricultural extension and
imperfect supervision in grower-processor contracts? And if they are ef-
fective, what is their marginal impact on grower yields? This article tests
whether these investments increase yields in a sample of the contract farming
arrangements signed between a processing rm and its growers in Madagas-
car. Within these contracts, the processor delegates its production of green
vegetables green beans, leeks, cucumbers, etc. to growers by providing
them with credit in the form of seeds, pesticides, and fertilizer. At harvest,
this input advance is repaid in crop, and the rm purchases the remainder
of the crop at a pre-agreed price, provided it satises certain quality require-
ments.
These contracts thus represent an important step away from spot markets
and toward vertical integration in a country where the production of cash
crops still remains marginal. Given that the markets for some of the inputs
required to produce such crops often fail and that grower-processor contracts
have the potential to resolve such market failures in developing countries
(Grosh, 1994), the institution of contract farming allows producers to diver-
sify their productive activities by helping them overcome non-convexities in
the production of cash crops. In addition, small rural producers who lack
the technical knowledge required to produce cash crops can often tap into
such knowledge when the processor they contract with provides agricultural
extension services as part of its supervision activities, as is the case in this
article. This is especially important in Madagascar, where the adoption of
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technologies aimed at increasing staple crop (i.e., rice) yields has often been
disappointing (Moser and Barrett, 2003 and 2006).
The contribution of this article is therefore to provide empirical evidence
on the e¤ects of agricultural extension and imperfect supervision in contract
farming arrangements in Madagascar, where such contracts have been shown
to be welfare-increasing (Minten et al., 2009). In light of the increased interest
in contract farming in developing countries (Little and Watts, 1994; Grosh,
1994; Key and Runsten, 1999; Warning and Key, 2002; and Reardon and
Timmer, 2005), knowing whether supervision increases productivity at the
margin can provide a key insight to rms wishing to enter contract farming
or expand their contract farming activities as well as to governments who
may be considering contract farming as an instrument of industrial policy.
In the contracts studied in this article, the agricultural extension services
provided by the processor and the imperfect supervision of growers by the
processor are conated into a single variable, i.e., the number of visits made
by a technical assistant. These technical assistants ensure that growers fol-
low a strict production schedule; that they apply the inputs provided by the
processor in the right proportions; that they do not sell (or leak) any of
the contracted crop on the local market; and that they do not divert some of
the inputs provided by the processor towards non-contracted crops. As such,
while it is impossible to precisely disentangle the e¤ects of agricultural exten-
sion and imperfect supervision, it is nonetheless possible to cleanly identify
and estimate their combined marginal impact on grower productivity, which
is of relevance to both the literature on extension in agricultural economics
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(Feder et al., 1987; Birkhaeuser et al., 1991; Umali-Deininger, 1997; An-
derson and Feder, 2004) and to the literature on imperfect supervision in
development economics (Frisvold, 1994; Jacoby and Mansuri, 2009).1
This article therefore tests whether agricultural extension and imperfect
supervision increase contracted crop yields by treating the number of visits
made by a technical assistant as an input in the contracted crop production
function. Given that the average producer grows several contracted crops on
a given contracted plot and, more importantly, that the number of such visits
varies at the crop rather than at the plot level, it is possible to control for
unobserved heterogeneity at the district, grower household, and contracted
plot levels. This setup provides clean identication of the e¤ect of agricultural
extension and imperfect supervision in these contracts and, as it turns out,
a one percent increase in the number of visits increases yield by 1.3 percent
on average, and by 1.7 percent when the number of visits is interacted with
the growers education so as to (crudely) tease out the agricultural extension
and imperfect supervision aspects of these visits.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 o¤ers a dis-
cussion of the contractual environment. In section 3, the data are presented
alongside descriptive statistics. Section 4 discusses in turn the estimation
strategy and the identication strategy. In section 5, the empirical results
are presented and discussed. Section 6 concludes.
1Unfortunately, the survey includes no information as to how the supervisors choose
who, when, and how to supervise, as only the growers were interviewed. Acquiring infor-
mation on the supervision process itself would require a di¤erent survey altogether.
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Contractual Environment
In a recent article using the same data to assess the technological spillovers
from contract farming on rice production (i.e., the staple crop in Madagas-
car), Minten et al. (2009) o¤er an in-depth discussion of the contracts signed
between Lecofruit, a processing rm who exports and sells the crops to super-
markets in the European Union (EU), and its growers. Lecofruit contracts
with over 9,000 growers in the Antananarivo region. Each contract is written,
and contracts are signed at the crop level given that growers can in principle
grow more than one crop. The contract proceeds as follows:
1. The grower and the processor agree on an amount of cultivable area
under contract and on a price at which the processor will buy the
growers output;
2. The processor provides the grower with seeds, pesticides, and fertilizer;
3. The grower undertakes production;
4. The technical assistant visits the grower;
5. Once the output is realized, the grower reimburses the processor in
crop for the input advance and sells the remainder of his harvest to the
processor at the price agreed upon in stage 1.
For the growers, the consequence of obvious shirking is non-renewal of
the contract by the processor. This is discussed in greater detail toward the
end of this section.
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Given that this article seeks to determine whether extension and imperfect
supervision have any e¤ect on yields, it is important to take a closer look
at the role of technical assistants in these contracts. The processor hires
a total of 300 team leaders who each coordinate the work of ve or six
technical assistants who reside in the same village as the growers they are
in charge of supervising.2 Hiring these technical assistants locally allows the
processor to exploit local knowledge about the growers it contracts with as
well as to reduce the transactions costs of providing extensions services to
and imperfectly supervising the growers.
The role of technical assistants is twofold. It consists rst of the usual
contract enforcement activities (i.e., preventing growers from shirking; from
diverting the processor-provided inputs to non-contracted crops; from leak-
ing contracted crops on the local market, etc.), but also of production man-
agement via agricultural extension services (i.e., ensuring that the growers
adhere to the production schedule decided by the processor; that they apply
seeds, pesticides, and fertilizers at the right time and in correct proportions;
etc.), and of output quality assurance by making sure that the contracted
crops conform to EU standards, whose phytosanitary requirements are much
stricter than Madagascars.
A legitimate concern in these contracts is that of side selling by the grow-
ers (or leakage; see Fafchamps, 2004), i.e., the sale of contracted output
on the local market in the hope of fetching a higher price than the price
2Given that these data do not include unique identiers for the supervisors, it is un-
fortunately impossible to control for the quality of supervision. The geographic indicators
(i.e., district dummies) used below o¤er a crude way of controlling for heterogeneous su-
pervision quality.
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agreed upon at the contracting stage. To counter such opportunistic behav-
ior, Lecofruit paid a much higher price for green vegetables than the local
market price, a practice similar to that of paying an e¢ ciency wage (Shapiro
and Stiglitz, 1984). Minten et al. (2009) report that 61 percent of growers
believe that the contract price is higher than the price on the local market
and discuss how some growers even went so far as to sell vegetables from non-
contracted plots to the processor given the high price paid by the processor.
In addition, 59 percent of growers report never having leaked, 24.5 percent
report only rarely having done so, and only 1.5 percent report regularly doing
so.3 Although these gures are subject to reporting bias, there is little to no
evidence statistical or anecdotal of side selling in 2004, i.e., the contract
year covered by the data.
The repayment rate of the growers as regards the input advance provided
by the processor was about 98 percent. Even though contracts are written
and the processor keeps a detailed database of its growers, it is unlikely
that Lecofruit would have legal recourse if a grower chose not to repay. In
Madagascar, resorting to the legal system to settle disputes involves a costly
and ine¢ cient process; institutions are weak; and agents tend to rely on
repeated interactions as an enforcement mechanism (Platteau, 1994a, 1994b;
Fafchamps and Minten, 2001; Fafchamps, 2004). Non-renewal of contracts is
thus the main threat used by Lecofruit in enforcing repayment, a mechanism
validated by the fact that these contracts are almost unambiguously benecial
to the growers. Indeed, Minten et al. report that the farmers who contract
3The statistics for never leaked and rarely leakedare signicant at the 1 percent
signicance level, whereas the statistic for regularly leakedwas only signicant at the
10 percent signicance level.
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with Lecofruit have higher, less variable incomes than others in the same
region who do not contract with Lecofruit.
Data and Descriptive Statistics
The data were collected under a joint Cornell UniversityKatholieke Univer-
siteit Leuven e¤ort in four districts in Madagascars Antananarivo province
during the months of June and July 2004. Each of the 200 randomly selected
households in the sample had entered a contract with Lecofruit, whose main
activity is to export fresh produce to the EU. Each selected household was
chosen based on the stratication criterion of owning at least two plots: (i)
a plot on which rice was grown during the agricultural season and on which
at least one contracted crop (e.g., green beans, cucumbers, leeks, etc.) was
grown during the o¤-season; and (ii) a rice plot on which rice was grown dur-
ing the agricultural season and on which a non-contracted crop was grown
during the agricultural o¤-season. Given that almost all agricultural house-
holds in Madagascar grow rice as a staple, this sampling strategy entails no
loss of generality regarding the households contracting with Lecofruit. Data
were collected at the household, contract, plot, and crop levels, so that ac-
counting for missing data, the end result is a sample of 315 contracted crops
across 188 grower households, each with one contracted plot. Among the 188
growers, 89 grew only one contracted crop while 74 grew two, 22 grew three,
and three grew four.
Table 1a presents descriptive statistics for these 315 contracted crops, for
the plots on which they are grown, and for the individuals growing them.
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The average yield for green vegetables was a little over 12 metric tons per
hectare.4 A little under two thirds of contracted crops were green beans, one
third were cucumbers, and only 2 percent were leeks. The average contracted
crop covered about 1.5 ares and required 165 person-hours of labor. At the
crop level, the number of visits by a supervisor averaged about 11. At this
point, it is important to note that respondents were asked how many times a
supervisor visited them for each contracted crop on the contracted plot. In
other words, supervision varies within each grower-plot a unique feature of
the data that allows controlling for grower-plot unobserved heterogeneity and
which will be discussed in greater detail when presenting the identication
strategy in section 4. Although there may be some concern as to whether
supervisors make separate visits to supervise production on separate crops,
crops are often grown sequentially in di¤erent, not-necessarily-overlapping
plantingsin these data, which explains where the within-grower, between-
crop variation in the number of visits by a technical assistant comes from. At
the time of the survey, respondents were asked to delimit the production cycle
of each planting by giving the beginning and end months for the production
of each planting. This allowed them to better circumscribe the number of
visits, even for partially overlapping plantings. Planting times did not fully
overlap for 20 percent of the growers who were growing more than one crop.
Alternatively, plantings did not fully overlap for 21 percent of the plantings
on plots which had within-plot crop variation.
The quantities of seeds, pesticides, and fertilizer used in production are
not reported in table 1 given that they are applied in equal proportions
4One hectare covers 10,000m2, so that one are covers 100m2.
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across plots by virtue of the contract terms, but the percentage of pesticides
provided by Lecofruit to each grower-plot-crop is reported, since some growers
choose to use some of their own pesticides so as to not have to reimburse
these inputs in crop at the end of the season. Lecofruit thus provides nearly
100 percent of the seeds, 37 percent of the pesticides, and 56 percent of
the fertilizer used in production. Moreover, in 100 percent of cases, the
contracted crop had been grown by the grower in 2003, indicating that every
grower in the data set had at least one year of experience producing the crops
he had contracted for with Lecofruit.
Turning to the characteristics of the grower households, the average house-
hold was composed of a little under six individuals, less than half of whom
were dependents.5 Over a quarter of growers were female and, at 38 years of
age, the average grower was relatively young, having completed six years of
education and having contracted with Lecofruit for almost eight years.
Finally, given that the empirical application below relies extensively on
the panel nature of the data to identify the e¤ect of the number of visits
by a technical assistant on yield, table 1b present panel descriptive statistics
for the dependent variable, the variable of interest, the production inputs,
as well as the variables that will be used as instruments to control for the
potential endogeneity of the number of technical visits.
5A households dependency ratio is equal in this case to the proportion of individuals
under 15 or over 64 within the household. It is thus a proxy for the quality of the
households labor endowment.
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Empirical Framework
This section rst discusses the estimation strategy used to study the e¤ect of
agricultural extension and imperfect supervision on yield in the application
at hand by presenting the equations to be estimated in section 5. It then
discusses the strategy relied upon to ensure clean identication of the e¤ect
of the number of visits by a technical assistant and addresses the potential
endogeneity of these visits with respect to yield.
Estimation Strategy
In order to test the e¤ects of agricultural extension and imperfect supervi-
sion in the contracts discussed in section 2, a simple empirical strategy is
adopted. The basic specication is that of a Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion in which the unit observation is the contracted crop; the yield of green
vegetables is the dependent variable; and labor, cultivated area, and the num-
ber of visits by a technical assistant are the inputs.6 Two basic specications
of this production function are estimated below. The rst specication pools
all observations into a cross-section and is such that
(1) ln yijk` = 1 + 1 lnxijkl + zk` + 1zjk` + 1d` + 1di + ijk`,
where yijk` is the yield of contracted crop i on plot j cultivated by grower
k in district `; xi is a vector of production inputs; zk` is a vector of grower-
6Following MaCurdy and Pencavel (1986), 0:001 was added to each observation of every
variable for which a logarithm was taken. This was done so as to not have to introduce
non-randomness in the sample by dropping all ln(0) observations, while still preserving
the order between observations.
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specic covariates; zjk` is a vector of plot characteristics; d` is a vector of
district dummies; di is a vector of crop dummies; and ijk` is an iid error term
that is distributed normally. Obviously, this specication neither accounts
for grower- or plot-level unobserved heterogeneity, so that in order to do so,
the second specication incorporates a district-grower-plot xed e¤ect and is
such that
(2) ln yijk` = 2 + 2 lnxijk` + 2djk` + 2di + ijk`,
where, yijk` is again the yield of green vegetables of contracted crop i
on plot j cultivated by grower k in district `; xijkl is a vector of production
inputs; djk` is a vector of district-plot-grower xed e¤ects;7 di is a vector of
crop dummies; and ijk` is an iid error term that is distributed normally.
This specication ensures that unobserved heterogeneity is controlled for at
the district, grower, and plot levels.8 Both specications are estimated by
ordinary least squares (OLS).
Because the variable of interest (i.e., the number of visits by a technical
assistant) conates the processors investment in both agricultural extension
and imperfect supervision, two sub-specications of equations 1 and 2 are
estimated: (i) a specication in which the number of visits by a technical
assistant enters production as an input; and (ii) a specication in which the
number of visits by a technical assistant and its interaction with the growers
education both enter production as inputs. Because the data do not include
7In this context, however, the grower and plot xed e¤ects are the same given that the
data include only one contracted plot per grower household.
8If households are better at growing specic crops, however, the estimates would be
biased even in the presence of xed e¤ects.
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specic information on the nature of each visit by a technical assistant, the
latter sub-specication is estimated so as to crudely tease out the e¤ects of
the imperfect supervision and agricultural extension aspects of these visits.
Although technical assistants, by virtue of residing in the same village as the
growers they are in charge of supervising, have a good idea of each growers
type, this variable is both unobserved by the econometrician and captured
by the household xed e¤ect, so that one must rely on a proxy to disentangle
the e¤ects of extension and supervision. The data include few grower-specic
covariates, so education is unfortunately the best such proxy one can use.
Consequently, if the coe¢ cient on the interaction term is positive (negative),
the advice dispensed by the technical assistants gets more (less) e¤ective the
more educated the grower.
Identication Strategy
Even though the number of visits by a technical assistant is in theory prede-
termined in equations 1 and 2 because these visits occur prior to the realiza-
tion of output, it remains possible that the number of visits is endogenous to
yield. While this concern is assuredly valid in equation 1, where unobserved
heterogeneity between plots and between growers is unaccounted for, the re-
mainder of this section argues that endogeneity of the number of visits by a
technical assistant to yield is of little concern in equation 2, in which district-
grower-plot xed e¤ects combined with crop dummies should eliminate most
of the correlation between the number of visits and the error term.
If technical assistants form rational yield expectations, these expectations
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are for the most part driven by within-district growing conditions as well as
by grower- and plot-specic characteristics. These, however, are taken care
of by the district-grower-plot xed e¤ects. The remaining unobserved het-
erogeneity is between crops within each district-grower-plot. One can think
of a scenario in which technical assistants consider the growers experience
with a given crop.
The xed e¤ects will also not purge the error term of its correlation with
the explanatory variables if, say, farmers demand fewer visits for certain crops
if technical help is available from friends or neighbors for specic crops, or if
the processor provides fewer visits to certain crops because local government
or other agencies are providing extension service for specic crops.
Unfortunately, the data do not include the exact number of years of ex-
perience each grower has with each contracted crop, whether growers get
technical help from friends or neighbors, or whether local extension agen-
cies provide extension services for contracted crops.9 Recall from table 1,
however, that each and every grower in the data has previously grown each
of the contracted crop that he or she grew during the current season. One
could thus argue that most of the unobserved heterogeneity is purged by
the district-grower-plot xed e¤ect. A similar reasoning can be applied to
cases where technical assistants choose to visit more intensively with grow-
ers whose plots are closer to the village; with growers of a certain type
(e.g., ability, e¢ ciency, talent, etc.); with growers whose plots exhibit certain
9The data set did include information on public extension services for rice agriculture,
but even if one wanted to use this as a proxy for the public extension services one receives
for contracted crops, this does not vary between crops within a grower. In other words,
the xed e¤ects control for public extension services for the staple crop.
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characteristics; etc.
Still, the data include three variables that (i) are likely causally correlated
to the number of visits by a technical assistant; (ii) are potentially exogenous
to yield; and (iii) vary between crops within each district-grower-plot. These
three variables are the percentages of seeds, pesticides and fertilizer provided
by the processor.
As regards the rst requirement, the number of visits by a technical assis-
tant will presumably be higher on the crops for which the processor provides
a higher proportion of seeds, pesticides, and fertilizer since in such cases,
the processor has more at stake by virtue of being owed a higher amount
of crop as reimbursement for the input advance. That is, the greater the
input advance to the grower, the more the processor will wish to reduce the
diversion of inputs to potentially more lucrative non-contracted crops, and
so the greater the number of visits by a technical assistant. In other words,
the more inputs a processor has advanced to a grower, the greater the proces-
sors loss in case of crop failure given that inputs are reimbursed in crop, and
thus the more technical advice the processor will wish to provide the grower.
Whether this requirement holds can be ascertained by looking at whether
the percentages of seeds, pesticides, and fertilizer provided by the processor
are signicant in the rst-stage instrumenting regression.
The second requirement is harder to establish. In this case, because seeds,
pesticides, and fertilizer are applied in equal proportions across contracted
plots, the amount per are of each input does not vary between plots, as per
Lecofruits technical requirements, and although the quantity of pesticides
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and fertilizer varies depending on the crop grown, this is controlled for using
crop dummies. The mix of processor- and grower-provided seeds, pesticides,
and fertilizer varies between crops and within each district-grower-plot. So
unless there are signicant quality di¤erences between the seeds, pesticides,
and fertilizer provided by Lecofruit and those provided by the growers, the
proportion these outputs provided by the processor should not a¤ect yield.
In what follows, the identifying assumption is therefore that if such quality
di¤erences do exist, they are small enough so as not to a¤ect signicantly
yield. This is justied by Lecofruits strict production requirements: if there
were signicant quality di¤erences between processor- and grower-provided
seeds, pesticides, and fertilizer, Lecofruit would simply prohibit growers from
using their own inputs, as it could easily bear the initial investment in full
for each contracted crop.
Therefore, in order to determine whether the number of visits by a tech-
nical assistant is endogenous to yield on the basis of these instruments, two-
stage least squares (2SLS) regressions are estimated in both the pooled cross-
section and the xed e¤ects specications, and their results are compared to
the OLS case using Hausman tests.
Estimation Results
This section presents both specications and the two sub-specications of the
Cobb-Douglas production function discussed in the previous section. Then,
because missing observations for grower-specic covariates cause the sample
size to di¤er between the pooled cross-section (N = 297) and xed e¤ects
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specications (N = 315), the latter are reestimated on a sample that is iden-
tical to the former. In both the pooled cross-section and in the xed e¤ects
specications, a comparison is run between the OLS and 2SLS estimation
results via Hausman tests. Finally, the estimated elasticities of yield with
respect to the number of visits by a technical assistant the main parameters
of interest in this article are presented and discussed.
OLS Estimation Results
Although the panel nature of the data allows controlling for unobserved het-
erogeneity at the district-grower-plot level, the data constitute an unbalanced
panel because the number of crops grown on each contracted plot di¤ers be-
tween growers and ranges from one to four. Consequently, while the growers
who produce two or more contracted crops on their contracted plot are in-
cluded in the xed e¤ects regressions estimated below, those who produce
only one contracted crop are left out of these regressions. If, as one cannot
rule out ex ante, the growers who grow only one contracted crop di¤er sys-
tematically from the growers who grow two or more contracted crops, then
the estimation results will be biased due to the non-random nature of the
sample. At the very least, they will not be generalizable to the whole sam-
ple, and will be subject to the caveat that they only apply to the grower
households who grow two or more crops on their contracted plot.
Turning to the estimation results, tables 2a and 2b present estimated
coe¢ cients for the Cobb-Douglas production function in the OLS case for
the specications discussed in the previous section. The di¤erence between
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tables 2a and 2b, however, is as follows. Table 2a drops the observations
for which some variables (i.e., household size, dependency ratio, relationship
length, and distance to plot from house) are missing, while table 2b keeps
them by replacing each missing value with a zero and by dening, for each
variable for which some values are missing, a new variable (not shown) equal
to one if the value is missing for this particular observation and equal to zero
otherwise. This method then allows keeping the information contained in
the fact that some values are missing.10
Both tables 2a and 2b show the estimation results for the pooled cross-
sectional specication both without the interaction between the number of
visits made by a technical assistant and grower education (model 1) and with
the interaction term (model 2) as well as for the xed e¤ects specication
both without (model 3) and with the interaction term (model 4). In each
model, the number of visits by a technical assistant has a positive e¤ect on
yield, but estimated elasticities are presented in table 3 below.
In models 1 and 2, labor has the expected positive marginal e¤ect on yield,
and there is evidence of an inverse plot sizeproductivity relationship (see
Barrett, 1996 and Barrett et al., 2010 for studies of the inverse productivity
relationship in Madagascar). Likewise, the greater the amount of available
household labor (as proxied by household size), and the better the quality
of available household labor (as proxied by the inverse of the dependency
ratio), the higher the yield.
Although models 1 and 2 include both district- and crop-level dummies,
10I am grateful to the anonymous who suggested this method of keeping the missing
observations.
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they fail to take into account unobserved heterogeneity at the grower and
plot levels. Models 3 and 4 control for district-grower-plot unobserved het-
erogeneity and also include crop dummies. Comparing their results to those
of models 1 and 2 is telling about the importance of controlling for unob-
served heterogeneity: in models 3 and 4, the apparent inverse relationship
between plot size and productivity disappears; the marginal e¤ect of labor is
multiplied more than threefold; and the dummy for leeks becomes signicant,
so that yields are lower for leeks than they are for cucumbers, snow peas,
and asparagus, i.e., the omitted categories.
2SLS Estimation Results
In order to help ascertain whether the number of visits by a technical assistant
is endogenous to yield, tables 4a and 4b respectively present the rst- and
second-stage estimation results for 2SLS versions of models 1 and 3. In both
2SLS specications, only the percentage of processor-provided pesticides and
fertilizer used in production are used as instruments for the number of visits
by a technical assistant. The percentage of processor-provided seeds was
dropped from the rst-stage equations because the processor provided almost
100 percent of the seeds on average, as shown in table 1.
Table 4a shows that in the district-grower-plot xed e¤ects specications,
the percentage of pesticides provided by Lecofruit had a signicant impact
at the margin on the number of visits made by a technical assistant. And
although the percentage of fertilizer provided by Lecofruit was not signif-
icant in the same equation, the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions
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indicated that both instruments should be kept, and the F -statistic for the
Cragg-Donaldson test of weak identication was above the threshold of 10
below which a set of instruments is considered as weak. Comparing the re-
sults of both specications in table 4a highlights yet again the importance of
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, as the e¤ect on the number of vis-
its of the percentage of processor-provided pesticides and fertilizer which
should both be positive if the story told above is right goes from nega-
tive to positive when xed e¤ects are included. Further, the percentage of
processor-provided pesticides was signicant at the 1 percent level in both
cases.
Table 4b shows the estimation results for the second-stage equations of
the 2SLS versions of models 1 and 3, and Hausman tests indicate that these
estimation results do not di¤er systematically from the results obtained by
OLS. Although these Hausman tests have low power because the bulk of the
probability mass rests on not rejecting the OLS specication, the p-value of
0.99 in each case o¤ers a certain amount of condence in the test result.
Elasticities
Does the combination of agricultural extension and imperfect supervision
embodied by the number of visits made by a technical assistant increase
yields in these contracts? The answer is obvious when looking at the elas-
ticities in table 3. In models 3 and 4, the estimated elasticities of yield with
respect to the number of visits made by a technical assistant, which are sig-
nicant at the 1 percent level, are respectively equal to 1.34 and 1.67, and
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these same estimated elasticities are not sensibly di¤erent in models 3and
4. More importantly, comparing models 1 and 2 with models 3 and 4 high-
lights yet again the crucial importance of controlling for district-grower-plot
unobserved heterogeneity in this context, since failing to do so understates
the elasticities by roughly one order of magnitude. Finally, reverting to mod-
els 4 and 4in tables 2a and 2b, it appears that the agricultural extension
aspect of the visits made by technical assistants gets less e¤ective as grower
education increases.11
Although the estimated elasticities may a prima facie seem high, recall
that the visits by a technical assistant serve a dual purpose in the applica-
tion at hand. So if these visits are particularly e¤ective in helping detect
instances of shirking, leakage, or input diversion, or if only slight departures
from Lecofruits strict production schedule cause considerable drops in yields,
then these estimated elasticities are within the bounds of what one should
expect.12
Conclusion
This article has tested whether a combination of agricultural extension and
imperfect supervision can serve to increase productivity in a sample of the
11In order to more e¤ectively tease out the e¤ect of extension, a referee suggested inter-
acting the number of visits by a technical assistant with a growers experience contracting
with Lecofruit instead of his education. Doing so (not shown) leads to an estimated elas-
ticity equal to 1.75, which is comparable to the elasticities obtained when interacting the
number of visits with education.
12Grosh (1994) also notes how the agricultural extension services provided by processing
rms are usually much more e¤ective than the same services provided by governments, if
only because growers tend to trust the former much more than the latter in developing
countries.
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contract farming arrangements signed by Lecofruit, a processing rm oper-
ating in Madagascars Antananarivo province. In this setting, agricultural
extension and imperfect supervision are conated in a single variable, i.e., the
number of visits made to each grower by a technical assistant working for the
processor. Given that the number of visits varies between crops within each
district-grower-plot, however, production functions controlling for district-,
grower-, and plot-level unobserved heterogeneity were estimated which re-
spectively included (i) the number of visits as an input in production; and
(ii) the number of visits as an input in production as well as the interaction
between the number of visits and grower education so as to tease out the
agricultural extension and imperfect supervision aspects of the number of
visits.
The empirical results show that the number of visits has an e¤ect on
productivity that is both statistically and economically signicant, with an
elasticity of yield with respect to the number of visits that is between 1.34
and 1.67, depending on the specication considered. Moreover, the empirical
results show that the agricultural extension aspect of the number of visits
is more e¤ective for growers who have completed fewer years of education,
indicating that Lecofruit should require its technical assistants to visit these
growers more often.
A few caveats are in order, however. First the size of the sample used in
this article, at about 300 observations, is somewhat small. Second, the data
did not include variation at the level of the processor, which is both a blessing
 one need not worry about either endogenous matching (Ackerberg and
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Botticini, 2002) or unobserved heterogeneity between processors and a curse
the empirical ndings are limited to Lecofruits operations. Future data
collection e¤orts should thus focus on collecting data on several processors
as well as on households who chose not to participate in contract farming.
Indeed, given that the contracts in this article have elsewhere been shown to
be associated with higher and more stable incomes as well as with shorter
lean seasons, being able to formulate policy recommendations at the industry
rather than rm level would be of prime interest, as would understanding the
determinants of participation in contract farming and the matching process
between growers and processors. Finally, while the variations across di¤erent
crops within the same plot have some advantage for the analysis in this
article, it also introduces the potential problem of comparing apples and
oranges. Indeed, including crop dummies do not automatically control for
this, especially if crop choice is endogenous. A better empirical strategy
would consist in comparing the yield of the same crop grown on the same
plot (or very similar plots), with di¤erent numbers of visits from technical
assistants. This is left for future research.
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Table 1a – Descriptive Statistics  
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Observations 
Crop-Level Variables 
Yield (Kg/Are) 123.50 (64.97) 315 
Labor (Person-Hours) 165.07 (53.83) 315 
Cultivated Area (Ares) 1.51 (6.73) 315 
Visits by a Technical Assistant 10.83 (11.31) 315 
Green Beans Dummy 0.65 (0.48) 315 
Leeks Dummy 0.02 (0.15) 315 
Cucumbers Dummy 0.33 (0.47) 315 
Processor-Provided Seeds (Percentage) 1.00 (0.03) 312 
Processor-Provided Pesticides (Percentage) 0.37 (0.27) 315 
Processor-Provided Fertilizer (Percentage) 0.56 (0.39) 315 
Crop Grown Last Year Dummy 1.00 (0.06) 315 
    
Plot-Level Variables    
Black Soil Dummy 0.56 (0.50) 315 
Red Soil Dummy 0.04 (0.21) 315 
Brown or White Soil Dummy 0.38 (0.49) 315 
Sand Soil Dummy 0.13 (0.34) 315 
Clay Soil Dummy 0.37 (0.48) 315 
Loam Soil Dummy 0.49 (0.50) 315 
    
Grower-Level Variables    
Grower Household Size (Individuals) 5.79 (2.53) 307 
Grower Household Dependency Ratio 0.46 (0.21) 307 
Grower Age 38.23 (10.45) 315 
Grower Female Dummy 0.28 (0.45) 315 
Grower Education (Completed Years) 6.41 (2.36) 315 
Relationship Length 7.77 (4.11) 311 
    
District-Level Variables    
District 1 Dummy 0.25 (0.43) 315 
District 2 Dummy 0.24 (0.43) 315 
District 3 Dummy 0.25 (0.43) 315 
District 4 Dummy 0.25 (0.44) 315 
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Table 1b – Panel Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  Mean (Std. Dev.) Observations 
Dependent Variable     
Yield Overall 123.50 (64.97) 315 
 Between  (65.53)  
 Within  (25.24)  
Explanatory Variables     
Visits by a Technical Assistant Overall 10.83 (11.31) 315 
 Between  (9.63)  
 Within  (2.42)  
Labor Overall 165.07 (53.83) 315 
 Between  (52.22)  
 Within  (17.48)  
Cultivated Area Overall 1.51 (6.73) 315 
 Between  (4.38)  
 Within  (4.74)  
 
Instruments for Number of Visits     
Proportion of Pesticides Provided  Overall 0.37 (0.27) 315 
by the Processor Between  (0.29)  
 Within  (0.02)  
Proportion of Fertilizer Provided  Overall 0.56 (0.38) 315 
by the Processor Between  (0.40)  
 Within  (0.00)  
Proportion of Seeds Provided by Overall 1.00 (0.03) 312 
the Processor Between  (0.02)  
 Within  (0.02)  
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Table 2a – OLS Estimation Results Omitting Observation with Missing Values 
 (1) 
Pooled Cross-Section 
(2) 
Pooled Cross-Section with 
Interaction Term 
(3) 
Grower-Plot  
Fixed Effects 
(4) 
Grower-Plot Fixed Effects 
with Interaction Term 
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.) 
Dependent Variable: Yield of Green Vegetables (Kilograms/Are) 
Visits 0.157*** (0.065) 0.313* (0.180) 1.336*** (0.233) 5.227*** (0.916) 
Visits*Education – – -0.023 (0.025) – – -0.556*** (0.127) 
Labor 0.498*** (0.159) 0.484*** (0.159) 1.802*** (0.418) 1.912*** (0.390) 
Cultivated Area -0.428** (0.209) -0.465** (0.213) 0.211 (0.383) -0.537 (0.395) 
Relationship Length 0.017 (0.015) 0.017 (0.015)     
Age -0.004 (0.037) -0.002 (0.037)     
Age Squared 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)     
Female Dummy 0.009 (0.120) 0.011 (0.120)     
Education 0.021 (0.024) 0.069 (0.058)     
Household Size 0.048* (0.025) 0.048* (0.025)     
Dependency Ratio -0.960*** (0.284) -0.945*** (0.285)     
Distance to Plot from House -0.005 (0.004) -0.005 (0.004)     
Red Soil Dummy 0.203 (0.266) 0.179 (0.267)     
Brown or White Soil Dummy 0.134 (0.134) 0.125 (0.134)     
Clay Soil Dummy -0.058 (0.194) -0.072 (0.195)     
Loam Soil Dummy -0.079 (0.176) -0.076 (0.177)     
Green Beans Dummy 1.393 (0.898) 1.395 (0.898) 0.109 (0.107) 0.157 (0.100) 
Leeks Dummy 0.433 (0.947) 0.446 (0.948) -0.901** (0.392) -0.797** (0.365) 
Cucumbers Dummy 1.285 (0.898) 1.286 (0.898) (Dropped)  (Dropped)  
District 2 0.277 (0.170) 0.274 (0.170)     
District 3 0.025 (0.158) 0.017 (0.158)     
District 4 -0.168 (0.159) -0.166 (0.159)     
Intercept 0.699 (1.385) 0.396 (1.414) -7.163*** (2.094) -8.355*** (1.967) 
Number of Plots 297 297 297 297 
Number of Growers – – 176 176 
p-value (All Coefficients) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
p-value (District-Grower-Plot FEs) – – 0.00 0.00 
R2 0.24 0.25 0.87 0.89 
Note: The symbols *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Variables of interest are highlighted. 
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Table 2b – OLS Estimation Results Including Observations with Missing Values 
 (1’) 
Pooled Cross-Section 
(2’) 
Pooled Cross-Section with 
Interaction Term 
(3’) 
Grower-Plot  
Fixed Effects 
(4’) 
Grower-Plot Fixed Effects 
with Interaction Term 
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.) 
Dependent Variable: Yield of Green Vegetables (Kilograms/Are) 
Visits 0.160** (0.063) 0.316* (0.174) 1.341*** (0.227) 5.207*** (0.887) 
Visits*Education – – -0.023 (0.024) – – -0.553*** (0.123) 
Labor 0.490*** (0.150) 0.478*** (0.151) 1.775*** (0.400) 1.925*** (0.373) 
Cultivated Area -0.419** (0.198) -0.455** (0.202) 0.182 (0.363) -0.519 (0.372) 
Relationship Length 0.017 (0.014) 0.017 (0.014)     
Age -0.002 (0.035) 0.000 (0.035)     
Age Squared 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)     
Female Dummy -0.002 (0.116) -0.001 (0.116)     
Education 0.020 (0.023) 0.068 (0.055)     
Household Size 0.044** (0.023) 0.044** (0.023)     
Dependency Ratio -0.947*** (0.272) -0.934*** (0.273)     
Distance to Plot from House -0.004 (0.004) -0.004 (0.004)     
Red Soil Dummy 0.214 (0.251) 0.192 (0.252)     
Brown or White Soil Dummy 0.143 (0.127) 0.135 (0.127)     
Clay Soil Dummy -0.038 (0.179) -0.048 (0.179)     
Loam Soil Dummy -0.069 (0.162) -0.063 (0.162)     
Green Beans Dummy 1.392 (0.873) 1.388 (0.873) 0.103 (0.103) 0.155 (0.096) 
Leeks Dummy 0.420 (0.922) 0.428 (0.922) -0.902** (0.383) -0.799** (0.357) 
Cucumbers Dummy 1.287 (0.874) 1.283 (0.874) (Dropped)  (Dropped)  
District 2 0.280* (0.158) 0.278* (0.158)     
District 3 0.019 (0.149) 0.010 (0.149)     
District 4 -0.150 (0.151) -0.149 (0.151)     
Intercept 0.692 (1.325) 0.400 (1.359) -7.028*** (2.007) -8.403*** (1.891) 
Number of Plots 315 315 315 315 
Number of Growers – – 188 188 
p-value (All Coefficients) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
p-value (District-Grower-Plot FEs) – – 0.00 0.00 
R2 0.24 0.25 0.87 0.89 
Note: The symbols *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Variables of interest are highlighted. Observations with 
missing values were preserved using the method described in the text of the article.  
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Table 3 – Supervision and Extension Elasticity of Yield of Green Vegetables 
Specification Elasticity (Std. Err.) N 
(1) Pooled Cross-Section  0.157** (0.065) 297 
(2) Pooled Cross-Section with Interaction Term   0.167*** (0.006) 297 
(3) Fixed Effects   1.336*** (0.233) 297 
(4) Fixed Effects with Interaction Term 1.737*** (0.136) 297 
(1’) Pooled Cross-Section  0.160** (0.063) 315 
(2’) Pooled Cross-Section with Interaction Term   0.169*** (0.006) 315 
(3’) Fixed Effects  1.341*** (0.227) 315 
(4’) Fixed Effects with Interaction Term  1.734*** (0.135) 315 
Note: The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 4a: 2SLS First-Stage Estimation Results 
 (1) 
Pooled Cross-Section 
(2) 
Grower-Plot  
Fixed Effects 
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.) 
Dependent Variable: Number of Visits by a Technical Assistant 
Labor 0.401*** (0.151) 0.251 (0.153) 
Cultivated Area 0.249 (0.191) 0.743*** (0.168) 
Relationship Length -0.004 (0.013)   
Age 0.030 (0.032)   
Age Squared 0.000 (0.000)   
Female Dummy 0.309*** (0.104)   
Education -0.006 (0.022)   
Household Size -0.006 (0.022)   
Dependency Ratio 0.575** (0.261)   
Distance to Plot from House 0.005 (0.003)   
Red Soil Dummy -0.519** (0.239)   
Brown or White Soil Dummy -0.268** (0.126)   
Clay Soil Dummy -0.068 (0.175)   
Loam Soil Dummy 0.061 (0.160)   
Green Beans Dummy 0.176 (0.785) 0.071* (0.040) 
Leeks Dummy -0.075 (0.847) -0.168 (0.178) 
Cucumbers Dummy 0.178 (0.785) (Dropped)  
District 2 -0.624*** (0.146)   
District 3 -0.353** (0.138)   
District 4 -0.146 (0.140)   
Processor-Provided Pesticides -0.093 (0.245) 5.769*** (1.150) 
Processor-Provided Fertilizer -0.862*** (0.172) 5.382 (6.840) 
Processor-Provided Seeds -1.779 (1.683) (Dropped)  
Intercept 1.703 (1.910) -4.385 (3.937) 
Number of Plots 294 294 
Number of Growers – 176 
p-value (All Coefficients) 0.00 0.00 
p-value (District-Grower-Plot FEs) – 0.00 
p-value (Joint Significance of IVs) 0.00 0.00 
F-statistic (Test of Weak IVs) 12.73 13.17 
p-value (Sargan Overidentification Test) 0.00 0.23 
R2 0.28 0.98 
Note: The symbols *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
Instrumental variables are highlighted. 
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Table 4b: 2SLS Second-Stage Estimation Results 
 (1) 
Pooled Cross-Section 
(2) 
Grower-Plot  
Fixed Effects 
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.) 
Dependent Variable: Yield of Green Vegetables (Kilograms/Are) 
Visits 0.418** (0.191) 1.592*** (0.545) 
Labor 0.449*** (0.167) 1.737*** (0.453) 
Cultivated Area -0.446** (0.217) 0.154 (0.407) 
Relationship Length 0.018 (0.016)   
Age -0.017 (0.039)   
Age Squared 0.000 (0.000)   
Female Dummy -0.063 (0.138)   
Education 0.027 (0.025)   
Household Size 0.051** (0.026)   
Dependency Ratio -1.002*** (0.298)   
Distance to Plot from House -0.008* (0.004)   
Red Soil Dummy 0.273 (0.279)   
Brown or White Soil Dummy 0.164 (0.140)   
Clay Soil Dummy -0.013 (0.203)   
Loam Soil Dummy -0.027 (0.186)   
Green Beans Dummy 1.401 (0.927) 0.081 (0.119) 
Leeks Dummy 0.521 (1.001) -0.973* (0.522) 
Cucumbers Dummy 1.280** (0.927) (Dropped)  
District 2 0.453 (0.212)   
District 3 0.128 (0.178)   
District 4 -0.125 (0.168)   
Intercept 0.492 (1.431) -7.309*** (2.133) 
Number of Plots 294 294 
Number of Growers – 176 
p-value (All Coefficients) 0.00 0.00 
p-value (District-Grower-Plot FEs) – 0.00 
p-value (Hausman Test) 0.99 0.99 
R2 0.97 0.87 
Note: The symbols *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
Variables of interest are highlighted. 
 
 
 
